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Raqamli Transformatsiya va Sun’iy Intellekt

INFLUENCE OF FALSE CLOCK SIGNALS ON IMAGE RECOVERY FROM СOMPROMISING ЕLECTROMAGNETIC ЕMANATIONS OF VIDEO PATH OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS

Foziljonov Khojiakbar Ismoil o‘gli1

1 Tashkent University of Information Technologies Named After Muhammad Al-Khwarizmi

Keywords

SDR video path of computer systems false clock signal time synchronization; image restoration TEMPEST image similarity metrics compromising electromagnetic emanations information security

Abstract

This paper presents an approach to ensuring the protection of computer system video signals from leakage via сompromising еlectromagnetic еmanations channels. This approach is based on the generation and emission of false clock signals. The influence of the false clock signal's temporal shift on the synchronization and reconstruction of visual information is considered. Experimental verification was performed using software-defined radio tools and the GNU Radio and TempestSDR software packages. The restoration quality was assessed using the SSIM metrics, Pearson's correlation coefficient, LPIPS, and PSNR. The obtained results demonstrate that increasing the temporal shift leads to deterioration of the structural and perceptual characteristics of the restored images, including the loss of the information component. The practical significance of this work lies in the possibility of increasing the level of protection of computer systems from technical information leakage channels.

Views: 98 Published: 2025-12-28 Pages: 174-180 Volume: 3 Issue: 6

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